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Abstract
The paper discusses some of the contributions of environmental activism to the development
of knowledge. The paper contrasts some of the main forms of knowledge-making that have
emerged among activists and raises a number of questions both about the political and cogni-
tive implications of such “green knowledge”. The general argument is that, in the future, new
types of interaction and new spaces for communication will need to be developed if green
knowledge is not to be incorporated into the dominant culture or reduced to ineffective forms
of protest.
 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. What is green knowledge?
In recent years, the politics of environmental knowledge have changed in funda-
mental ways. Throughout the world, the general emphasis has tended to shift from
the protection of an external realm of non-human nature, to the integration of an
environmental concern into our own human societies. Environmental knowledge, we
might say, is in the process of being appropriated into our cultures and our econom-
ies. In the name of sustainable development, the ambition has been to combine dis-
parate forms of knowledge about nature and society into new kinds of theories and
concepts. Green knowledge is not so much about the environmental conditions in
which we live, so much as about how we can take those conditions into account
in pursuing more sustainable paths of socio-economic development[1]. This paper
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identifies some of the different types of contributions that have come from the world
of environmental activism.
In order to capture what is significant, I discuss four “ ideal–typical” categories of
activism, which I call community, professional, militant, and personal. There could
be more, there could be fewer, but I think that these four categories, which I have
derived from Bron Szerszynski [2] can usefully cover the spectrum of what is most
visible, while keeping us from getting lost in details. Within each category, there
are some significant differences, both among countries and within countries, but there
are also, I would contend, certain common characteristics. Presenting them in this
way can, I hope, provide some new ways of conversing among them, as well as
some new ways of considering what they represent.
2. Community environmentalism
The community environmentalists and the professional environmentalists share a
secular, or instrumental, emphasis, a focus on results, on changing policies and polit-
ical decisions rather than on changing beliefs. Some of them retain, in their own
persons, something of the spiritual, or ethical, motivation that played such a strong
role in the early days of environmentalism, but in most of their activities, the spiritual
side of things is toned down. In terms of their relations to knowledge, both the
community and the professional environmentalists tend to favor the factual, the
empirical, or scientific–technical, approaches, over the normative, or moral–philo-
sophical; and their practices, or dissemination strategies are more argumentative and
rational than exemplary and ethical. They have, in many countries, emerged from a
common “movement” origin, but, as the years have progressed, they have tended to
drift apart, as the community environmentalists have tried to uphold the original
strong democratic ambitions, while the professionals have responded to the
expanding range of opportunities that have opened up. In the 1970s at least some
activists found ways to turn their environmental engagement into professional
careers, and the career trajectories have diversified and multiplied ever since.
The community environmentalists consist of the primarily decentralized groups
that oppose particular cases of environmental destruction and develop alternative
initiatives for environmental improvements in their communities. As such, their work
consists, in large measure, in the mobilization of “ local” knowledge and experiences.
There are, of course, many different kinds of such groups around the world, but what
they all have in common is the ambition to empower local groups or communities, by
providing some new kind of factual information, or data that the community pre-
viously did not possess. Such information is primarily of two main types: empirical
details about particular environmental problems and information about solutions, or
what to do about the problems that are already known. What is involved is thus a
kind of local research, a process of discovering new knowledge about the place in
which one lives or works, as well as a popularization of the research findings.
Until the 1990s, most of this community environmentalism was technical or medi-
cal, a kind of grass-roots engineering and lay epidemiology, or what Alan Irwin [3]
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has called citizen science. The idea was to disclose the hazards, risks, and environ-
mental dangers that were lurking behind the scenes in the local community, and
develop ways of mobilizing local skills in the creative resolution of those dangers.
And while there still are a lot of amateur, and now highly competent, citizen scien-
tists, working throughout the world to identify problems and develop solutions, what
has been added in the 1990s is an ambitious and much broader social agenda. For
sustainable development is not merely about environmental problems; it is also about
local governance, about making democracy work. As such, the knowledge and the
skills that are involved have become much broader. They include techniques of com-
munication, translation of concepts, and, most crucially, combination and synthesis.
Community activism today is about combining local knowledge and experiences with
global challenges, and it is important that we understand the difficulties involved.
No longer “environmental-centered” , the challenge for local activists is to create
processes of dialogue, and facilitate what might be termed social innovations of
strong democracy.
In Europe, which I know best, it has been primarily under the rubric of local
Agenda 21 that such groups have been given both a mandate, but also an ever more
influential role to play in environmental politics and policy-making in recent years
[4]. Many of these activities were started in the immediate aftermath to the Brundt-
land report of 1987, Our Common Future, which was the work of an international
commission headed by former Norwegian prime minister (and environmental
minister) Gro Harlem Brundtland, now director of the World Health Organization
(WHO). In the Scandinavian countries, as well as in Germany and The Netherlands,
there were rather substantial “ follow-up” programs that were set up after the report,
and in Norway, Brundtland’s home country, there has been, as might be expected,
a somewhat more organized effort to respond to the call for sustainable development
than in many other countries.
In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in
Brazil produced an ambitious political agenda for the twenty-first century, the so-
called Agenda 21, which formulated a large number of specific tasks at different
levels of society as a way to implement more sustainable paths of socio-economic
development. In many European countries, laws were passed requiring all munici-
palities to produce their own Local Agenda 21 documents, with various plans and
projects for implementation. One criterion for these plans has been the involvement,
or participation, of the public in measures to achieve sustainable development. But,
of course, the interpretation of what public participation actually means in practice
has varied enormously from municipality to municipality and from country to coun-
try [5].
In many developing countries, there is also a substantial community-based
environmentalism, often supported by development assistance organizations in the
industrialized countries. These efforts at green development, as William Adams [6]
has called them, were, at an early stage, stimulated by the training programs and
other activities of the United Nations Environmental Program, which was established
after the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. Through the years,
the involvement of non-governmental development and environmental organizations
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in these projects has increased, so that many environmentalists have developed
expertise in project management and particular techniques of public participation
and collaboration.
Ideas and procedures of “participatory rural appraisal” and the concept of sus-
tainable development itself, linking environmental protection to economic pro-
duction, were born out of these experiences. In the 1970s, the World Wildlife Fund,
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, and the United Nations
Environment Programme together formulated a World Conservation Strategy, which
criticized the relegation of environmental protection to a special, and often marginal,
sector in the world of “development” . What has changed over the past fifteen years
is the involvement of the private sector. Now, as elsewhere, there is often a commer-
cial interest in many of these projects. As development assistance has been linked
in many countries to the needs of the national industry, it is sometimes more difficult
than before to see who is actually benefiting from specific sustainable develop-
ment projects.
Many of the programs that have been established in the 1990s follow the precepts
of ecological modernization, or green business, in trying to “economize” ecology
and translate community activism into new forms of management and engineering.
As such, the meanings of participation are highly varied, and often incompatible.
The participation of a local government official is often a very different thing than
the participation of a potential consumer of the products from a “cleaner” local fac-
tory. While empowerment is the aim for all participatory activities of community
environmentalism, it is important to recognize that empowerment is not without con-
tradictions. In the words of Robert Chambers, “whether empowerment is good
depends on who is empowered, and how their new power is used. If those who gain
are outsiders who exploit, or a local elite which dominates, the poor and disadvan-
taged may be worse off” [7, p. 217].
In many respects, these new kinds of activities can be considered an outgrowth
of the environmental activism that first manifested itself in the 1960s and 1970s. It
was primarily as a collection of specific local groups, with specific local grievances,
that an environmental movement emerged in many parts of the world, and this cate-
gory of resistance thus represents a kind of continuity across the decades. What has
changed and developed is what might be termed the social, or political consciousness,
among them.
The NIMBY, for “not in my backyard” , label came into use in the 1970s, as this
kind of environmentalism took on a greater political significance, particularly in the
United States, in the so-called toxic waste protests, starting in the Love Canal area
of Buffalo, New York, when local citizens discovered poisons buried under their
communities [8]. Like most such labels, it was coined by the opponents of the
resisters, and is thus not particularly helpful in understanding what community-based
environmental activism is all about.
In Europe, as well as in North America, these kinds of protests have had a number
of common features that are perhaps useful to characterize. On the one hand, they
have been lay protests; that is, the mobilization, or organization, has been that of
concerned citizens, often new to politics, who have reacted to particular local prob-
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lems. On the other hand, they have been specific protests, in the sense that they have
focused on particular cases of environmental degradation. And thirdly, they have
been temporary; that is, they have usually been confined, or limited, in time. There
have been recurrences, or remobilizations, and there have been, in many cases,
expansions or extensions, or even institutionalizations, in terms of forming local
parties, or alliances with other similar groups. But the actual process of resistance
has been difficult to sustain, or make into a permanent feature of community life.
In some European countries, the recent wave of community-based environmen-
talism has been, to a large extent, state supported, and organized through particular
projects and local initiatives. The critical, and oppositional, elements of environmen-
tal activism — and knowledge making — have inevitably tended to be toned down,
and the result, in many countries, is a kind of popular science activity in the name
of ecology that serves as a complement to official research and development pro-
grams. What has emerged is thus a kind of surrogate and highly circumscribed move-
ment, which receives public support for its activities, but, on the other hand, is given
little role to play in official decision-making processes.
3. Professional environmentalism
The second category has, to a large extent, evolved out of the first; the rise of an
environmental movement in the 1970s created a vast range of opportunities for new
kinds of professionals to emerge within its ranks [9]. In many countries, as the
movements fell on hard times in the period of “counterrevolution” of the 1980s, it
was the professionals who kept the environmental movement alive. In countries like
Britain and the United States, where the neo-liberal backlash was particularly intense,
many of the environmental protest activities were incorporated into what came to
be referred to as mainstream environmental organizations. But, at the same time,
there developed sources of tension between those ever more professional organiza-
tions and local activist groups, who often felt that they knew more about their situ-
ation and their particular struggle than the campaigners, or fund-raisers, or experts,
from the professional organizations.
In many European countries, the professional organizations — especially the
newer ones like Greenpeace — tended to “ take over” the mantle of the movement,
both in terms of media attention as well as in regard to general public interest [10].
But even more importantly, Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund, as well as
the national conservation societies, became the agenda-setters, the agents who formu-
lated the strategies for the movement as a whole, and who took on the responsibility
of representing the broader social and political interest in the environment. Together
with the Green parties that started to win their way into local government and even
into some national parliaments in the 1980s, the professional organizations became
the “stand-ins” for the broader public, and the forms of agency through which civil
society was offered opportunities to participate in what came to be called sustainable
development. It is perhaps no accident that the term itself was originally formulated
by the World Wildlife Fund in its World Conservation Strategy, that was produced
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together with the UN Environment Programme and the International Union for
Societies for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 1980.
It is important to remember that many of these organizations predated the environ-
mental movement of the 1960s, and thus embody traditions and “ residual” cultural
formations that have been difficult for the organizations to transcend. As conservation
societies and ornithological associations, as tourist organizations and rural preser-
vation councils, as wildlife federations and wilderness clubs, these organizations
became a part of the political cultures of most industrialized countries in the early
twentieth century, and many of them extended their reach into the so-called
developing countries, in the immediate postwar era, when the former colonies began
to win their independence. There are thus discursive frameworks and organizational
experiences — a kind of traditional knowledge — that many of these organizations
are able to build upon and mobilize in their contemporary activities. But it also
becomes difficult for them to escape from the limits of their histories, to transcend
their traditions.
Already in the 1960s, these organizations, dating back to the nineteenth century,
came to be complemented, and, in some places, challenged, by new organizations
that were reacting to the new kinds of pollution and urban environmental problems
that had been identified in the public debate. Many of their founding members were
young people who had been associated with the older organizations, but now found
them too staid and established. Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace were formed
at that time and they soon grew into international alliances, as the UN Conference
in 1972 helped transform this new environmentalism into a global movement. A
number of other national organizations and green parties emerged in many countries
to coordinate the efforts of the predominantly local action groups that sprung up to
oppose nuclear energy and other types of environmental problems.
By the 1980s, the new and the old organizations had become ever more pro-
fessional, and particularly when new forms of “grass-roots” protest started to emerge
in the late 1980s, it became increasingly common to refer to the larger organizations
as a “mainstream” environmental movement that, in many respects, had come to
have interests of its own. According to many observers, they had become institutions,
rather than movements, more like bureaucratic organizations than local activists
[10,11].
The activist, or social movement, organizations that were so prominent in the
1970s, when environmentalism represented for many young people around the world
an alternative way of life, based on an ecological “world view” and oppositional
forms of political action, have been displaced by a differentiated realm of so-called
non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, with an international reach. Among other
things, these NGOs provide advice for business firms, government agencies and pub-
lic education programs, lobby for legislative and policy reforms, and take part in a
wide variety of international development assistance projects. They also participate,
directly and indirectly, in negotiating environmental agreements on such issues as
climate change, biodiversity, and technology transfer. Explicit activist organizations
still exist, of course, but they are, in many countries, merely a small part of what has
become an expansive “non-governmental” realm, or environmental movement sector.
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The large variety of non-governmental organizations that are part of what I term
professional environmentalism makes it difficult to generalize, but there are nonethe-
less some characteristic features that many of these organizations seem to share,
particularly in terms of their forms of knowledge-making, or cognitive praxis [12].
On the one hand, they have paid staff employees who do most of the work. They
are, to be sure, open to volunteers, but they are all formalized in the sense of having
some people who work for them for a living who make, or produce, environmental
knowledge as a vocation, as a job. This is related to the second defining character-
istic, namely the priority that is given to expertise. All of these organizations are
based on a particular kind of expert competence, be it legal, scientific, administrative,
commercial, educational, or disruptive. They derive their organizational identity from
a particular kind of cognitive input that they provide to environmental politics. They
are the experts of activism. Like all producers of expert knowledge, they are thus
dependent on patrons, on those who provide the resources for collecting, analyzing,
sifting, presenting expert knowledge.
Finally, they are permanent, or at least established organizations with an ambition
to be permanent, which means that organizational growth and survival are important
factors in their choice of topics to work on and methods to apply. They need, in
other words, to find a “niche” in the social ecology of knowledge production, neither
duplicating what is done in other places, nor competing with those who are able to
do a particular task more effectively. This organizational dynamic, or niche-seeking,
is perhaps the main factor behind the specialization, and division of labor, that exists
among professional environmentalists. The problem, however, is that there is no
organized coordination of activity, no collective setting of agenda, and, even more
seriously, no accountability to any particular user of the knowledge that is produced.
These organizations are only accountable to their formal directors, either elected
governing boards (as is the case with the large membership-based organizations) or
self appointed leaders, who operate much like the directors of business firms.
The identity of these organizations is derived primarily from their representative
character; they have defined themselves as giving voice to a particular part of the
public, as representative stand-ins. And this means that their own mode of operation
is based on a view of representation, but also on one or another ideological perspec-
tive. There is an important sense in which the identity of these organizations is
derived from an organizationally defined ideology of environmental politics, with
clear conceptions of what politics is, but also what kind of politics the particular
organizations considers to be its “brand” .
While many, if not most, of the NGOs are primarily concerned with achieving
political results, that is, in affecting or influencing policies, laws, and agreements,
there are other organizations whose primary activity consists of knowledge making
and dissemination. There have developed throughout the world both independent
“ think tanks” of various kinds, as well as units associated with universities,
intergovernmental agencies, as well as research and consulting firms, that provide
information and education in environmental policy, and the sub-sets of substantive
issues that comprise environmental politics.
Some of these green experts are directly associated with local activists and civic
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groups, providing advice or training of one kind or another. The Wuppertal Institute
in Germany, the Centre for Science and Environment in India, and the World
Resources Institute in the United States are all examples of professional environmen-
talists that mediate between the more “ traditional” scientists and engineers at univer-
sities and the general public and its environmentalist representatives.
The products of these green experts are highly varied, but most of them are the
factual reports about particular environmental issues — transportation, industrial pol-
lution, climate change, energy technology — that are primarily collections of scien-
tific information, popularizations at best, vulgarizations at worst. These reports, such
as those produced by the Worldwatch Institute, are typically written by journalists
with some scientific training, or by scientists with some journalistic training, and
they tend to be sector-specific, policy-oriented and directed to non-expert readers.
While the works that are produced by professional environmentalists continue to find
audiences — and indeed the finding of audiences, the selling of the products, the
“public relations” have become an important element of the cognitive praxis of many
environmental organizations — the knowledge that is produced is rarely subjected
to serious academic scrutiny.
Perhaps the main challenge for professional environmentalists — both in the aca-
demic and non-governmental domains — is to help reestablish a sense of coherence
in relation to all of the increasingly disparate movements, networks, campaigns, and
alliances that they relate to. For the large organizations, this would involve the devel-
opment of an explicit process of organizational reflection, by which the aims and
strategies that first inspired the organization are continually examined and brought
up to date. In Europe, this means, in particular, a much more open-ended discussion
about the impact of Europeanization on environmental policy; that is, the emergence
of the European Union as a major actor. Many professional organizations are well
connected to their own national policy bodies and environmental authorities, but the
challenge increasingly is to extend their international range, or global reach. For the
transnational organizations, such as Greenpeace and WWF, the challenge is to
develop new forms of communication with other national groups and organizations,
but also with the new “players” in environmental politics — in business and aca-
demic life, as well as in civil society and government. Much like companies, the
transnational NGOs have pursued their own organizational aims, largely without
any broader political or social strategy; but as corporations and corporate interest
organizations increasingly seek to set the overall agenda for environmental politics,
the NGOs need to articulate a clearer and more coherent political program.
4. Militant environmentalism
While the community-based and professional environmentalists, for all their differ-
ences, are mostly interested in changing policies and affecting political decisions,
there are a large number of environmentalists whose main concerns are more moral,
or spiritual. But, as with the political environmentalists, the moralists are also highly
varied and contradictory in their aims. My distinction here, between militant and
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personal, is meant to bring out the fundamental difference between those who prac-
tice their environmental morality in public, and those who do it more privately. In
the first category, which I call militant environmentalism, we have the groups that
have broken away, usually for ideological reasons, from the mainstream organiza-
tions — so-called splinter groups — as well as the ever more militant groups that
have sprung up in recent years in many parts of the world to liberate animals, reclaim
the streets, and generally disrupt the normal operations of social and economic
activity [13].
In the 1980s and 1990s, new kinds of organizations emerged, such as Earth First!
and the Sea Shepherds, which have brought new issues onto the agenda, as well as
new methods of protest. Many of these more recent organizations have been inspired
by so-called deep ecology, and they have also been influenced by anarchist, syndical-
ist, and even terrorist political and ideological traditions. In philosophical terms,
many militant environmentalists share a belief in what might be termed species
equality, a form of biocentrism or ecocentrism that places human beings on equal
footing with other life forms.
Carolyn Merchant [14] has given this idea framework the name of “partnership
ethics” in order to accentuate the dimension of sharing — of resources, space, nat-
ure — that is central to many militant environmentalists. The idea of partnership,
for Merchant and many other radical ecologists, is related to the “gender equality”
that has been propounded by feminists, and there is, in much militant environmen-
talism, a strong influence from “ecofeminist” thinkers such as Merchant and Vandana
Shiva. As Merchant puts it,
A new cultural politics and a new environmental ethic arising out of women’s
experiences and needs can provide an ethic of sustainability. Many of the goals
and gains of feminists are central to that new discourse and ethic. Women’s inter-
ests and nature’s interests intertwine. The goal is a sustainable partnership with
the natural world [14] (p. 205).
It is important to recognize, however, that there are widely divergent meanings
of both deep ecology and partnership ethics, most especially perhaps in terms of the
role they play in the identity of the activists. A useful rule of thumb is whether the
ideas of deep ecology or animal liberation or partnership ethics serve as an ideology
or as a utopia, in the sense that Karl Mannheim once defined those terms [15]. An
ideology relates to a pre-conceived framework of belief, while a utopia envisions
not-yet-existing relations and orients behavior to exemplifying the utopian vision.
The ideological “use” of deep ecology is thus a translation of the idea of species
equality to a principle of action, while the utopian use is a translation of much the
same idea to a criterion of living experimentation. Where the one tends to “ reduce”
the ideas to a code of conduct, the other opens the ideas to innovative application.
Deep ecology, as a label for the more spiritually minded, and often violently
driven, environmental activists who occupy building sites and prevent forests from
being cut, is, in any case, something quite different from deep ecology, as it was
first discussed by Arne Næss, the Norwegian philosopher, who coined the term. For
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Næss, deep ecology was to be distinguished from the shallow, from the mundane
political struggles, and it was not so much proposed as an alternative to traditional
environmental politics as a necessary complement. But it was also, for Næss, a philo-
sophy, a kind of belief system, inspired by respect and humility for non-human
nature, that was strongly influenced by Indian philosophy and, particularly, by the
teachings of Gandhi [16].
As an ideology for militant environmentalism, deep ecology has taken on a life
of its own. It developed in the United States in the 1980s, primarily as a way to
react to the increasing rapaciousness of the forestry companies in the American west-
ern states. Like many other ideologies before and since, deep ecology
has become an attractive phrase for many people, who tend to bend the term to
their needs without bothering to learn what it was originally meant to imply [16],
p. 203].
The founders of Earth First! and other spiritually minded American environmentalists
adapted deep ecology to their own purposes, and, by so doing, gave it an extremist
connotation. Later, activists in Britain, in launching their own brand of militance to
oppose the proliferation of highways across the countryside, transferred deep ecology
back to Europe, apparently after discovering it in publications of the American
organization, Earth First! [17].
If the mainstream organizations stand for a kind of “ incorporation” of activism
into the dominant culture, the splinter groups can be considered to represent what
Raymond Williams [18] once characterized as “ residual” cultural formations in
relation to green knowledge-making. On the one hand, they are often infused with
political ideologies, such as anarchism and even terrorism, or sabotage, that are part
of a tradition of protest in many countries. On the other hand, they are characterized
by a defense of practices and ways of life and, for that matter, animal species that
seem to be in danger of elimination. Their resistance is based on an active identifi-
cation with a lived tradition, of small-scale farming or shopkeeping, for example.
They oppose any and all sorts of incorporation, seeing the dominant culture of com-
mercialization and globalization as the main enemy. When Raymond Williams
referred to residual cultural formations, he was thinking of such things as a “ rural
way of life” or a sense of rural community, which, although weakened, and all but
incorporated into the dominant culture, could nonetheless provide sources of oppo-
sition and alternative values that were still vibrant and alive.
Militant environmentalists, in their active resistance, are an important part of the
environmental movement, but, like the community-based activists, they have a tend-
ency to “ reduce” the struggle to the defense of one particular value, and disregard
the need for compromise and innovation. Their protest can thus become what Willi-
ams termed “archaic” , defending a remnant of the past that cannot realistically or
meaningfully be revived in anything but a symbolic manner. This is even more
apparent in the case of the animal liberation groups that have sprung up in the 1990s,
particularly among youth sub-cultures, often of a vegan orientation. In Sweden and
Finland, where these groups are perhaps especially prominent and visible, it is not
713A. Jamison / Futures 35 (2003) 703–716
deep ecology, as much as a traditional Nordic primitivism from the Viking age,
that seems to be an active ingredient in the “cosmology” of the animal liberation
struggles [19].
While Earth First! activists appropriated deep ecology into the strongly religious,
or spiritual, American environmental discourse, Nordic animal rights activists have
primarily appropriated the ideas of Peter Singer, an Australian philosopher, and one
of the first to call for the liberation of animals in the 1970s. But while Singer, then
as now, has developed his arguments for animal liberation from a primarily utilitarian
perspective, the young activists in Sweden and Finland have often translated Singer’s
ideas into a very different kind of discursive framework. For many of the young
militants, there is both an interest in paganism and anti-modernism, as well as animal
liberation, as such.
5. Personal environmentalism
The final category of ecological resistance is the most amorphous and variegated.
It includes all of the myriad attempts to make the political personal, from the mystical
teachings of new age philosophy to the individual efforts to shop in an environmen-
tally conscious manner. What is most striking about personal environmentalism, at
least to me, is its increasing diversification over time, the fact that ecological, or
green, values and attitudes have spread into so many different kinds of lifeworlds
since they first began to be articulated in the 1960s and 1970s. Very few global
citizens have remained unaffected by ecological ideas in their personal behavior,
although the sheer variety of what is called ecological makes it hard to say what, if
anything, it all means in regard to broader patterns of cultural transformation. Here
is where environmental activism has had perhaps its most meaningful impacts, but
the meanings, because they are inevitably so individual and personal, are extremely
difficult to decipher and evaluate.
Most visible, at least in the industrial countries, has been the new age culture, or
sub-culture, which has, in many way, continued what was started by the so-called
hippies of the 1960s counterculture. The members of the counterculture expressed
themselves by wearing colorful clothes, but also in a voluntary simplicity and a
youthful openness to non-Western cultures that led many to move to the countryside
and take journeys to the East, as well as take ecological ideas and environmental
problems seriously. As the environmental movement developed, the personal and
the political have tended to separate out. The new age has grown into a substantial
and innovative genre of music and art, as well as inspired a number of schools of
therapy and spiritual networks, with activities spread throughout the world. What
has changed through the years is both the variety and diversity of the new age culture,
which have increased enormously, as has the commercial flavor or tone of much of
what is on offer. Even the new age has been colonized by the dominant culture.
The less spiritual, and more secular, sides of personal environmentalism have taken
on a new importance in the 1990s, in particular in relation to the marketing of the
new genetic technologies [20,21]. There is a widely felt anxiety about these new
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products that seems to indicate that the human exploitation of non-human reality has
reached a new kind of threshold. Whatever value genetic technologies may have —
and there can be no denying that, both in food production and medicine, there is
much that they can contribute — large segments of the public remain unconvinced.
It is as if tinkering with genetic material is simply going too far, that this is the
point where the utilitarian ethic, the human imperialist dominance over the rest of
the planet, must be limited, even curtailed.
But even though the opposition to GMOs has provided a focus of contention
for many consumers and consumer organizations, green consumerism is filled with
ambiguities. For some, particularly those who are already involved in environmental
politics in a more organized way, it is meaningful to connect one’s lifestyle to one’s
politics. In relation to food consumption, in particular, eating green can become an
important part of one’s identity, and, at least, on the individual level, a way to
internalize ecology. In a similar fashion, gardening and various forms of ecological
craftsmanship can provide meaning to a contemporary, fragmented lifestyle. Describ-
ing the so-called ecological footprint that we leave behind as we travel through life
has become an important task for many personal environmentalists, and, in recent
years, the organization Friends of the Earth has even provided some quantitative
methodological guidelines [22].
One difficulty in aggregating from individual experiences, and individual foot-
prints, is simply in knowing what is ecological. There are so many different forms
of eco-labelling and so many different criteria, or schools, of ecological, or organic,
or biodynamic, or health food, that the actual meaning of ecological consumption
tends to be dissipated. And it is all but impossible to be consistent. Consumption
choices are not made in a vacuum, but are rather part of broader strategies of “every-
day life” that are difficult to conduct in a rational fashion. An understanding of the
cultural dynamics of personal environmentalism requires in-depth investigation
among relatively small groups of people. The motivations that stimulate new age
cultural expression, as well as green consumerism, are extremely varied, and it has
proved difficult to turn a personal commitment into a more all-encompassing process
of social and cultural change. But there can be little doubt that personal environmen-
talism will continue to flourish and grow, and, in particular, provide serious problems
for the biotechnology industries to market their products successfully.
6. Conclusions
In this cursory review of some of the main contributions from activism to green
knowledge, I have tried to identify a number of dilemmas that affect the kinds of
knowledge that are being made, and, in particular, the kinds of barriers or constraints
that the emerging ecological culture is up against. One of the most striking problems,
however, is the fact that, however much we do, and however creative we try to be,
there are simply fewer places in which we are allowed to operate. There is a dimin-
ishing public sphere, or public space, that is open for the flowering of the ecological
culture. It gets harder and harder to share the earth.
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A major part of the problem is the aggressiveness of the dominant culture. Through
its enormous array of products, its seemingly endless capacity to commercialize any
possible human need or vice, and, not least, its colonization of other life worlds, the
dominant culture draws us into its grasping arms. Even in the various projects of
“public participation” that have been carried out around the world in the quest for
sustainable development, it is the private sector, the business culture, that all too
often takes the lead. It is not that business involvement is not desirable, it is that all
business involvement carries a price tag with it. No company, no money-making
operation is interested in doing something for nothing.
And that is why it is so crucial that there remain open in our societies other spaces,
non-corporate spaces for social learning and cognitive praxis. We need a public
sphere that means something; we need to have opportunities for coming together,
for sharing what we know, for discussing freely and critically the challenges that
confront us collectively, as communities and societies. Effective public engagement
in environmental politics needs, of course, people who are willing to be involved,
who, in one of its various forms, have an “ecological consciousness” ; but there are
also a number of supportive conditions, or social innovations, that are even more
important if that consciousness, so to speak, is be cultivated and contribute to cul-
tural transformation.
There is, it seems to me, an important role for engaged academics, and other
“ intellectuals” to play in keeping the spaces for communication and recombination
open. Indeed, this is an increasingly crucial, but often neglected, task in the evolving
politics of the environment. In the 1960s and 1970s, environmental and other new
social movements carved out public spaces for creative experimentation that provided
opportunities for interaction among concerned scientists and concerned citizens.
There were science shops, alliances of workers and academics, radical science jour-
nals, citizen review boards, renewable energy workshops and a rather wide-ranging
search for new forms of cognitive praxis and public involvement in knowledge mak-
ing.
In the intervening years, the conditions for such interaction have changed dramati-
cally, as environmental movements have become differentiated and subdivided, and
as activism has become more and more a business like any other. In addition, univer-
sities throughout the world have grown ever more commercialized, and the academic
way of life has come to be strongly colored by the acquisitive and highly competitive
values of the marketplace. Academics are more or less required to become
entrepreneurs if they are to be successful in their careers, seeking funds and opport-
unities, as well as making direct and indirect connections with business firms. There
is nothing intrinsically wrong with this opening of universities to the commercial
marketplace, so long as opportunities remain for other kinds of activities, as well.
But the result has been, in many countries, that the spaces for critical reflection are
getting smaller and, if they exist at all, they are seldom to be found at universities.
Universities have traditionally prided themselves on their autonomy and their pur-
suit of academic freedom, and those remain important values to uphold. But they
should not become vague abstractions, defending “neutrality” and inaction at the
expense of critical reflection. As many universities now align themselves ever more
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closely to corporate and business interests, at least some of them, or some of us
within the universities, need to contribute more of our resources, time and intellectual
energy to working with other “actors” in the society. The risks are fairly obvious:
while the brokers of green business are busily recruiting the most enterprising and
entrepreneurial, it is often the most militant and extreme of the “critical ecologists”
who remain willing to take them on. It is perhaps time to raise the call: Bridge-
builders of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your loyalties!
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